By: By Avigail M. Olarte in Bangkok/Asia News Network
Chiang Khan, northeast Thailand (ANN) - Every morning at sunrise, Sutas Kom Sri casts his net into the river out of faith. As the fog unveils the horizon, the Mekong River looms before him, luring him into the richness of its waters.
But like other fishermen in this part of the Mekong in northeast Thailand, his daily catch has been steadily declining through the years. As a result, he says, more and more fishermen have been abandoning their nets.
"There’s lesser fish and they’re smaller in size," he says. "We’re earning less than half than what we used to get eight years ago." The reason for this, he believes, is the waters’ increasing unpredictability wrought by dams in China in the upper mainstream.
Now he sees a bigger threat, a new dam in Xayaburi province in northern Laos, the first hydropower dam to be built on the mainstream of the Mekong River. But unknown to him and to the other fishermen in Chiang Khan, they would likely stand to lose in a complex web of power play that courts the interests of only the moneyed and the powerful.
The Xayaburi dam will supply electricity to the Electricity Generating Authority (Egat), Thailand’s state energy body, with 1,260MW of power for 30 years. One of the biggest infrastructure firms in Thailand, Ch. Karnchang Public Co Ltd (CK), will be the developer with Thai banks funding it. Under the plan, commercial operations will start in January 2019.
"Once the dam is born, everything will be lost," Sutas says.
Sutas is among the 60 million people who live and feed from the lower Mekong basin. Considered as the ‘Mother of All Rivers’, the Mekong River is the largest freshwater fishery in the world. Described as the blood line of the Mekong Region, it yields 2.5 million tonnes of fish per year—valued at US$3 billion to $6 billion—making it the most productive inland fishery in the world.
Should the Xayaburi dam be built, over 200,000 villagers will be affected. Of the 1,000 fish species in the Mekong, 41 will face extinction, including the critically endangered Mekong giant catfish.
Worrying, too, is the fact that at least 23 migratory fish species will most likely be blocked from both upstream and downstream, disrupting the life cycles of the migratory fish and reducing the river catch of up to 600,000 metric tonnes.
"The Xayaburi dam could cause irreparable damage to the Mekong fisheries. The risk of permanent damage to the Mekong biodiversity and fisheries is too great and the cost too high," says Zeb Hogan of the University of Reno in the US in a technical review he wrote for the International Rivers, a network working to protect the Mekong River.
At what cost?
Harnessing the power of the Mekong River to supply electricity to countries in the region dates way back to the 1960s, upon the creation of the Mekong Committee—a body created to promote and supervise development projects in the Mekong. At the time, seven large-scale multi-purpose dams were proposed.
According to the Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (Terra), these did not push through due to “geopolitical conflicts in the region and concern over social and environmental impacts”.
By 1994, the committee presented a plan to build 11 “run-of-river” hydropower dams of only 30 to 60 metres high on the Mekong mainstream.
The dam design was said to be ideal, having a much lesser impact than large storage dams. Most of the dams were planned to produce power for export to Thailand, including Xayaburi, according to a report by Terra.
When the countries signed the 1995 Mekong Agreement, the committee was replaced by the Mekong River Commission (MRC).
This move, says Terra, was supposed to “represent a shift in its mandate” and ensure sustainability. But studies on the mainstream projects continued, causing nongovernment groups to stage campaigns against the plan.
At present, there are 12 planned mainstream dams that could provide power by as much as 14,697MW, enough to sustain a country like Thailand for the next 15 to 20 years.
An evaluation commissioned by the MRC revealed, however, that these run-of-river projects cannot proceed without a fisheries baseline data, as the likely impacts on the river ecology and livelihood have yet to be properly studied.
Experts confirm that any changes in the flow of the water will "seriously damage critical habitats" like the pools of fish and organisms that contribute to the entire river’s food web.
As it is, hydro dams built on the Mekong tributaries such as the Pak Mun dam in northeast Thailand and the Theun-Hinboun in central Laos have led to a decline in fish harvest and loss of food and livelihood to communities.
Fishermen like Udon Ruenkam in Chiang Khan know this to be true. Having been a fisherman for 30 years, he has seen less and less fish from Don Khai, the island in the middle of the Mekong River where Lao and Thai fishermen go to every day to catch fish.
"The water is now too fast, and it goes up and down very often. At times, instead of fish, our nets haul in rubbish," he claims, adding that dams built on the rivers have triggered these. "If they build the Xayaburi dam, we will lose everything."
Transboundary impact
The scenario has equally alarmed other countries downstream, especially Cambodia where 70 per cent of its 9.8-million population resides within 15km of the river.
The loss of livelihood would have a devastating impact on villagers who heavily depend on fishing and farming as their main sources of income, Cambodia being the rice basket in the delta. The dam could potentially lessen the flow of sediments or nutrients downstream which aid farmers in growing their rice and crops.
The project’s Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) in 2010—a study done by TEAM Consulting Engineering and Management Co Ltd of Thailand and Colenco Power Engineering Limited of Switzerland for CK—was highly criticised for making no mention of any transboundary, damaging impact that the Xayaburi dam might cause.
The EIA covered villages within the project site in Laos, claiming only a few villagers will lose their land and vegetable gardens. This estimate, reports the International Rivers, is not even close to representing the number of villages that will be affected downstream and upstream.
The project’s Social Impact Assessment (SIA), a document prepared by TEAM, also had no recognition of the rights of the villagers to “full and fair compensation for lost land”. The SIA states that it will compensate by providing livelihood assistance, not with cash assistance.
An official from the Department of Electricity in Laos confirms that at least three villages have been asked to voluntarily relocate inland, with no money being offered. In an interview with AsiaNews, he says the government will help them by providing alternative job opportunities, which have yet to take place.
Consultations as ‘rubber stamp’
Experts fear that the people may not be fully aware of the extent of impact of the dam. Only 60 per cent of the people in Xayaburi who were interviewed for the EIA said they had heard about the project. But after the survey, 82.6 per cent said they were in favour, and only 2 per cent disagreed.
But International Rivers notes the figures are not surprising “given the strong central state support for the project and the reluctance of the people to contradict state policy”.
What’s more, the TEAM consultants were there to “sell the project”. In fact, the group said, the fishermen were even told to “merely adjust their gear and methods so they can carry on catching fish like before”.
Unlike in Laos, the consultations held in three provinces in Thailand in 2011 showed strong opposition from villagers.
"The people said they want additional study on fish migration and aquatic impact. They’re worried that the dam will cause erosion in the banks and the fish yield will be reduced," says an official at the Thailand National Mekong Committee of the MRC.
She says the first national consultation on the Xayaburi dam in Thailand took place in the northern province of Chiang Rai in January 2011. Participants in that meeting said the information on the transboundary impact was not enough and that further studies are needed.
The same concerns were raised in two subsequent consultations in Loei and Nakorn Phnom in February, highlighting the fact that no single has study has yet fully covered the extent of damage a mainstream dam like Xayaburi would have on the Mekong River’s resources.
In Vietnam, the member country that has voiced much opposition to the project, two consultations were held in Can Tho City and Ha Long City in early 2011.
The people said full precaution is needed for a dam that will set a precedent for other proposed mainstream dams especially since the proposal was unclear on mitigation solutions.
Cambodians, meanwhile, supported the 10-year delay of building dams in the mainstream as proposed by the MRC in the Strategic Environment Assessment (SEA), a study done on hydropower development in the Mekong. The report recommended no decisions should be made until “remaining uncertainties and knowledge gaps” are addressed.
Access to information
The consultations in the four countries were done in compliance with the 1995 MRC Mekong Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development. Under this, the member countries are to jointly review any development project proposed for the mainstream under the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA).
Under the PNPCA, the member states should conduct prior consultation within members of the MRC before any project is to proceed. When the Lao government notified MRC in September 2010 about its plan in Xayaburi, nearly seven months after the EIA was completed, member countries were notified. This led to technical reviews and consultations in each country, a process that needed to be completed within six months.
But during the consultations in other countries, the EIA was reportedly not released and was treated as a secret document on orders of the Lao government.
The National Mekong Committee in Thailand also confirms that during its consultations, they could not give out a copy of the EIA because it was considered confidential. “If it were under our laws, we’re obligated to disclose the EIA to the public within a month. But for Xayaburi, we were not allowed to disclose it.”
“Public input was absent in the EIA,” says Dr Philip Hirsch of the Australian Mekong Resource Centre in a paper he wrote for International Rivers. “The prior consultation process is flawed because stakeholders (did not have) access to the EIA.”
A senior knowledge management officer of a nongovernment organisation in Laos confirms that the government refused to release a copy of the EIA.
"A person from the MRC who attended the consultation said the government merely wanted the people to to say ‘yes’ and they were merely informing them how the dam will benefit the country. The villagers were also confused since they were fed with too much technical information," he tells AsiaNews. (The person’s name and his organisation’s are not disclosed on the interviewee’s request.)
But unlike the EIA, the dam’s Feasibility Study was released to the public in February 2011.
The feasibility study, which was done by CK and TEAM, had the same conclusions as that of the EIA. It read that the “social impact of the barrage is at medium level, while the environmental impact is at low level”.
It added that the project would benefit the Mekong countries, especially Laos and Thailand, and urged for “speedy negotiations and early conclusion of agreements” between Laos, the investor and Egat”.
The politics of power
But by April 19, during an MRC Joint Committee Special Session in Vientiane, the MRC reported that all countries instead agreed to defer the decision on the Xayaburi dam, with Vietnam strongly recommending the SEA findings that projects on the mainstream be deferred for another 10 years.
Less than a month later, during a side meeting of the prime ministers of Laos and Vietnam at the 18th Asean Summit in Jakarta, the Lao premier announced that “it agreed to temporarily suspend the Xayaburi Dam”. Both countries also agreed to instruct agencies to conduct a joint research on the dam under the framework of the MRC.
Two days before that meeting, however, a letter leaked to the International Rivers revealed that Laos on May 5 hired Poyry Energy, a Finnish consulting firm, to determine whether Laos has fulfilled its obligations under the 1995 Mekong Agreement. By June 2, Poyry said the Lao government had complied with the agreements and that it had taken the concerns of the member countries into proper consideration.
By June 9, the Xayaburi Company wrote a letter to Egat saying that Laos has complied with the 1995 Agreement and that it was now ready to execute the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with Egat.
Under the PPA, CK Karnchang, a subisidiary of Xayaburi Power, will be purchasing 95 per cent of the project’s 1,260MW capacity at a rate of about 2 baht per unit (6 US cents).
Several months later, Thai Senator Surajit Chiravet, member of the Senate Committee on Corruption Investigation and Good Governance Protection was quoted that a high-ranking official from the Ministry of Energy said in a Senate hearing that the PPA for Xayaburi Dam had been signed on October 29 and that Xayaburi had already been included in Thailand’s Power Development Plan.
But when news of the decision of the MRC members during the December 8, 2011, meeting in Siem Reap, Cambodia broke, declaring a need for further study yet again, Thai senators launched an investigation. They wanted to know if Egat violated the Thai government’s instructions to have the MRC member governments’ approval first before any agreement to purchase power from Xayaburi is to be made.
Breaches of obligations
According to International Rivers, Senator Surajit said the signing of the PPA likely violated the resolution of the National Energy Policy Council, the body that has the authority to approve power import projects, stating that projects like Xayaburi need to fully comply with the 1995 Mekong Agreement before any of the countries are to enter into any concessions.
"By moving under the radar of the Mekong River Commission, Thailand and Laos have threatened the spirit of regional cooperation and the integrity of the 1995 Mekong Agreement...it’s no surprise that the dam builder Ch. Karnchang has lobbied extensively for the dam to proceed," says Piapoorn Deetes of the International Rivers.
Ame Trandem, Southeast Asia programme director of International Rivers, says Thailand now has to cancel the PPA because the process was not in accordance with the 1995 agreement.
"The gaps still exist and to proceed with the dam without a regional decision is not only reckless and irresponsible, it also threatens regional security," she says.
But for the Lao engineer from the Department of Electricity, who refuses to be identified for fear of reprisal, he says the PNPCA is nothing but a “document” to implement the 1995 Agreement and that it should be treated independently from the economic agreement.
"The project is momentarily delayed but we will not stop," he confirms. Construction for roads and buildings is still ongoing in Xayaburi, he says, but no infrastructure work has started on the river. According to him, Laos will have to wait for the countries to agree until they can start with the dam structure.
In the meantime, the Lao government is considering paying for another firm to conduct more studies on the transboundary impact. It is also waiting for another study spearheaded by the MRC, which would include the transboundary impact of hydro projects like Xayaburi in the Mekong region, as part of the agreement during the meeting in Siem Reap.
"We have to consult with other countries to make them happy. We’re being gentlemen now," he says.
But should Laos proceed with the project without the required consensus, it would be in breach of its obligations under the Mekong Agreement.
It would also be violating its commitment to negotiate and consult in good faith under international laws, specifically under the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. All countries in the Mekong Region under the Rio declaration agreed to consult each other first should there be projects “that may have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect”.
And should there be disputes that cannot be resolved among the countries, Trandem says under the Mekong Agreement, they may elevate matters to the International Court of Justice.
But for fishermen like Sutas, whose voice and others like him have been largely ignored and unheard, the message is simple: “We love the Mekong River. We don’t want any dams.”
But like other fishermen in this part of the Mekong in northeast Thailand, his daily catch has been steadily declining through the years. As a result, he says, more and more fishermen have been abandoning their nets.
"There’s lesser fish and they’re smaller in size," he says. "We’re earning less than half than what we used to get eight years ago." The reason for this, he believes, is the waters’ increasing unpredictability wrought by dams in China in the upper mainstream.
Now he sees a bigger threat, a new dam in Xayaburi province in northern Laos, the first hydropower dam to be built on the mainstream of the Mekong River. But unknown to him and to the other fishermen in Chiang Khan, they would likely stand to lose in a complex web of power play that courts the interests of only the moneyed and the powerful.
The Xayaburi dam will supply electricity to the Electricity Generating Authority (Egat), Thailand’s state energy body, with 1,260MW of power for 30 years. One of the biggest infrastructure firms in Thailand, Ch. Karnchang Public Co Ltd (CK), will be the developer with Thai banks funding it. Under the plan, commercial operations will start in January 2019.
"Once the dam is born, everything will be lost," Sutas says.
Sutas is among the 60 million people who live and feed from the lower Mekong basin. Considered as the ‘Mother of All Rivers’, the Mekong River is the largest freshwater fishery in the world. Described as the blood line of the Mekong Region, it yields 2.5 million tonnes of fish per year—valued at US$3 billion to $6 billion—making it the most productive inland fishery in the world.
Should the Xayaburi dam be built, over 200,000 villagers will be affected. Of the 1,000 fish species in the Mekong, 41 will face extinction, including the critically endangered Mekong giant catfish.
Worrying, too, is the fact that at least 23 migratory fish species will most likely be blocked from both upstream and downstream, disrupting the life cycles of the migratory fish and reducing the river catch of up to 600,000 metric tonnes.
"The Xayaburi dam could cause irreparable damage to the Mekong fisheries. The risk of permanent damage to the Mekong biodiversity and fisheries is too great and the cost too high," says Zeb Hogan of the University of Reno in the US in a technical review he wrote for the International Rivers, a network working to protect the Mekong River.
At what cost?
Harnessing the power of the Mekong River to supply electricity to countries in the region dates way back to the 1960s, upon the creation of the Mekong Committee—a body created to promote and supervise development projects in the Mekong. At the time, seven large-scale multi-purpose dams were proposed.
According to the Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (Terra), these did not push through due to “geopolitical conflicts in the region and concern over social and environmental impacts”.
By 1994, the committee presented a plan to build 11 “run-of-river” hydropower dams of only 30 to 60 metres high on the Mekong mainstream.
The dam design was said to be ideal, having a much lesser impact than large storage dams. Most of the dams were planned to produce power for export to Thailand, including Xayaburi, according to a report by Terra.
When the countries signed the 1995 Mekong Agreement, the committee was replaced by the Mekong River Commission (MRC).
This move, says Terra, was supposed to “represent a shift in its mandate” and ensure sustainability. But studies on the mainstream projects continued, causing nongovernment groups to stage campaigns against the plan.
At present, there are 12 planned mainstream dams that could provide power by as much as 14,697MW, enough to sustain a country like Thailand for the next 15 to 20 years.
An evaluation commissioned by the MRC revealed, however, that these run-of-river projects cannot proceed without a fisheries baseline data, as the likely impacts on the river ecology and livelihood have yet to be properly studied.
Experts confirm that any changes in the flow of the water will "seriously damage critical habitats" like the pools of fish and organisms that contribute to the entire river’s food web.
As it is, hydro dams built on the Mekong tributaries such as the Pak Mun dam in northeast Thailand and the Theun-Hinboun in central Laos have led to a decline in fish harvest and loss of food and livelihood to communities.
Fishermen like Udon Ruenkam in Chiang Khan know this to be true. Having been a fisherman for 30 years, he has seen less and less fish from Don Khai, the island in the middle of the Mekong River where Lao and Thai fishermen go to every day to catch fish.
"The water is now too fast, and it goes up and down very often. At times, instead of fish, our nets haul in rubbish," he claims, adding that dams built on the rivers have triggered these. "If they build the Xayaburi dam, we will lose everything."
Transboundary impact
The scenario has equally alarmed other countries downstream, especially Cambodia where 70 per cent of its 9.8-million population resides within 15km of the river.
The loss of livelihood would have a devastating impact on villagers who heavily depend on fishing and farming as their main sources of income, Cambodia being the rice basket in the delta. The dam could potentially lessen the flow of sediments or nutrients downstream which aid farmers in growing their rice and crops.
The project’s Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) in 2010—a study done by TEAM Consulting Engineering and Management Co Ltd of Thailand and Colenco Power Engineering Limited of Switzerland for CK—was highly criticised for making no mention of any transboundary, damaging impact that the Xayaburi dam might cause.
The EIA covered villages within the project site in Laos, claiming only a few villagers will lose their land and vegetable gardens. This estimate, reports the International Rivers, is not even close to representing the number of villages that will be affected downstream and upstream.
The project’s Social Impact Assessment (SIA), a document prepared by TEAM, also had no recognition of the rights of the villagers to “full and fair compensation for lost land”. The SIA states that it will compensate by providing livelihood assistance, not with cash assistance.
An official from the Department of Electricity in Laos confirms that at least three villages have been asked to voluntarily relocate inland, with no money being offered. In an interview with AsiaNews, he says the government will help them by providing alternative job opportunities, which have yet to take place.
Consultations as ‘rubber stamp’
Experts fear that the people may not be fully aware of the extent of impact of the dam. Only 60 per cent of the people in Xayaburi who were interviewed for the EIA said they had heard about the project. But after the survey, 82.6 per cent said they were in favour, and only 2 per cent disagreed.
But International Rivers notes the figures are not surprising “given the strong central state support for the project and the reluctance of the people to contradict state policy”.
What’s more, the TEAM consultants were there to “sell the project”. In fact, the group said, the fishermen were even told to “merely adjust their gear and methods so they can carry on catching fish like before”.
Unlike in Laos, the consultations held in three provinces in Thailand in 2011 showed strong opposition from villagers.
"The people said they want additional study on fish migration and aquatic impact. They’re worried that the dam will cause erosion in the banks and the fish yield will be reduced," says an official at the Thailand National Mekong Committee of the MRC.
She says the first national consultation on the Xayaburi dam in Thailand took place in the northern province of Chiang Rai in January 2011. Participants in that meeting said the information on the transboundary impact was not enough and that further studies are needed.
The same concerns were raised in two subsequent consultations in Loei and Nakorn Phnom in February, highlighting the fact that no single has study has yet fully covered the extent of damage a mainstream dam like Xayaburi would have on the Mekong River’s resources.
In Vietnam, the member country that has voiced much opposition to the project, two consultations were held in Can Tho City and Ha Long City in early 2011.
The people said full precaution is needed for a dam that will set a precedent for other proposed mainstream dams especially since the proposal was unclear on mitigation solutions.
Cambodians, meanwhile, supported the 10-year delay of building dams in the mainstream as proposed by the MRC in the Strategic Environment Assessment (SEA), a study done on hydropower development in the Mekong. The report recommended no decisions should be made until “remaining uncertainties and knowledge gaps” are addressed.
Access to information
The consultations in the four countries were done in compliance with the 1995 MRC Mekong Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development. Under this, the member countries are to jointly review any development project proposed for the mainstream under the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA).
Under the PNPCA, the member states should conduct prior consultation within members of the MRC before any project is to proceed. When the Lao government notified MRC in September 2010 about its plan in Xayaburi, nearly seven months after the EIA was completed, member countries were notified. This led to technical reviews and consultations in each country, a process that needed to be completed within six months.
But during the consultations in other countries, the EIA was reportedly not released and was treated as a secret document on orders of the Lao government.
The National Mekong Committee in Thailand also confirms that during its consultations, they could not give out a copy of the EIA because it was considered confidential. “If it were under our laws, we’re obligated to disclose the EIA to the public within a month. But for Xayaburi, we were not allowed to disclose it.”
“Public input was absent in the EIA,” says Dr Philip Hirsch of the Australian Mekong Resource Centre in a paper he wrote for International Rivers. “The prior consultation process is flawed because stakeholders (did not have) access to the EIA.”
A senior knowledge management officer of a nongovernment organisation in Laos confirms that the government refused to release a copy of the EIA.
"A person from the MRC who attended the consultation said the government merely wanted the people to to say ‘yes’ and they were merely informing them how the dam will benefit the country. The villagers were also confused since they were fed with too much technical information," he tells AsiaNews. (The person’s name and his organisation’s are not disclosed on the interviewee’s request.)
But unlike the EIA, the dam’s Feasibility Study was released to the public in February 2011.
The feasibility study, which was done by CK and TEAM, had the same conclusions as that of the EIA. It read that the “social impact of the barrage is at medium level, while the environmental impact is at low level”.
It added that the project would benefit the Mekong countries, especially Laos and Thailand, and urged for “speedy negotiations and early conclusion of agreements” between Laos, the investor and Egat”.
The politics of power
But by April 19, during an MRC Joint Committee Special Session in Vientiane, the MRC reported that all countries instead agreed to defer the decision on the Xayaburi dam, with Vietnam strongly recommending the SEA findings that projects on the mainstream be deferred for another 10 years.
Less than a month later, during a side meeting of the prime ministers of Laos and Vietnam at the 18th Asean Summit in Jakarta, the Lao premier announced that “it agreed to temporarily suspend the Xayaburi Dam”. Both countries also agreed to instruct agencies to conduct a joint research on the dam under the framework of the MRC.
Two days before that meeting, however, a letter leaked to the International Rivers revealed that Laos on May 5 hired Poyry Energy, a Finnish consulting firm, to determine whether Laos has fulfilled its obligations under the 1995 Mekong Agreement. By June 2, Poyry said the Lao government had complied with the agreements and that it had taken the concerns of the member countries into proper consideration.
By June 9, the Xayaburi Company wrote a letter to Egat saying that Laos has complied with the 1995 Agreement and that it was now ready to execute the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with Egat.
Under the PPA, CK Karnchang, a subisidiary of Xayaburi Power, will be purchasing 95 per cent of the project’s 1,260MW capacity at a rate of about 2 baht per unit (6 US cents).
Several months later, Thai Senator Surajit Chiravet, member of the Senate Committee on Corruption Investigation and Good Governance Protection was quoted that a high-ranking official from the Ministry of Energy said in a Senate hearing that the PPA for Xayaburi Dam had been signed on October 29 and that Xayaburi had already been included in Thailand’s Power Development Plan.
But when news of the decision of the MRC members during the December 8, 2011, meeting in Siem Reap, Cambodia broke, declaring a need for further study yet again, Thai senators launched an investigation. They wanted to know if Egat violated the Thai government’s instructions to have the MRC member governments’ approval first before any agreement to purchase power from Xayaburi is to be made.
Breaches of obligations
According to International Rivers, Senator Surajit said the signing of the PPA likely violated the resolution of the National Energy Policy Council, the body that has the authority to approve power import projects, stating that projects like Xayaburi need to fully comply with the 1995 Mekong Agreement before any of the countries are to enter into any concessions.
"By moving under the radar of the Mekong River Commission, Thailand and Laos have threatened the spirit of regional cooperation and the integrity of the 1995 Mekong Agreement...it’s no surprise that the dam builder Ch. Karnchang has lobbied extensively for the dam to proceed," says Piapoorn Deetes of the International Rivers.
Ame Trandem, Southeast Asia programme director of International Rivers, says Thailand now has to cancel the PPA because the process was not in accordance with the 1995 agreement.
"The gaps still exist and to proceed with the dam without a regional decision is not only reckless and irresponsible, it also threatens regional security," she says.
But for the Lao engineer from the Department of Electricity, who refuses to be identified for fear of reprisal, he says the PNPCA is nothing but a “document” to implement the 1995 Agreement and that it should be treated independently from the economic agreement.
"The project is momentarily delayed but we will not stop," he confirms. Construction for roads and buildings is still ongoing in Xayaburi, he says, but no infrastructure work has started on the river. According to him, Laos will have to wait for the countries to agree until they can start with the dam structure.
In the meantime, the Lao government is considering paying for another firm to conduct more studies on the transboundary impact. It is also waiting for another study spearheaded by the MRC, which would include the transboundary impact of hydro projects like Xayaburi in the Mekong region, as part of the agreement during the meeting in Siem Reap.
"We have to consult with other countries to make them happy. We’re being gentlemen now," he says.
But should Laos proceed with the project without the required consensus, it would be in breach of its obligations under the Mekong Agreement.
It would also be violating its commitment to negotiate and consult in good faith under international laws, specifically under the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. All countries in the Mekong Region under the Rio declaration agreed to consult each other first should there be projects “that may have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect”.
And should there be disputes that cannot be resolved among the countries, Trandem says under the Mekong Agreement, they may elevate matters to the International Court of Justice.
But for fishermen like Sutas, whose voice and others like him have been largely ignored and unheard, the message is simple: “We love the Mekong River. We don’t want any dams.”
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